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# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 12

## New Era in Venezuela

by Herbert L. Matthews

Revolutions are the last resource of oppressed peoples. A high price almost always must be paid, but no price is too high to pay for liberty. Venezuelans have now made this sacrifice and won their freedom. In so doing they wrote the finest page in their history since the Venezuelan, Simón Bolívar, led his people to independence from Spanish rule a century and a quarter ago.

Anyone who thinks in terms of explosive Latin American republics staging comic opera palace revolutions at sporadic intervals would be far from the mark in thinking in these terms about Venezuela. On January 23 after a three-week struggle, General Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela was defeated when the unarmed people went into the streets of Caracas and other cities and fought and died until the dictator, his military clique and his hated security police were beaten down.

The series of recent successful revolutions represents a tidal wave in Latin American history. This is the twilight of military dictators, the *caudillos* who have dominated Latin American events since the era of independence from Spain that began in 1810. There was nothing accidental or freakish about the Vene-

zuelan revolution. It was inevitable, and the only question in the minds of those who knew the country was when and how the explosion would take place.

The succession of events can be boiled down without too much distortion. Venezuela started to become fabulously wealthy when oil was discovered there in 1922. The estimated production now is around 2,800,000 barrels a day, and the country is the second largest producer and the largest exporter of oil in the world. In recent years huge deposits of iron ore were discovered in eastern Venezuela, and the country is now second only to Canada as a source of steel for the United States. American investments in these two industries total about \$3 billion.

Money, like power, tends to corrupt, but it is also a great fertilizer. On the one hand there was the ignoble struggle of the military cliques and their civilian supporters for the spoils of office. On the other hand came the ferment that was bound to accompany an influx of wealth even where a small group at the top kept most of it themselves or squandered it on showy public works in and around the capital of Caracas and on its air- and seaports.

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Some money went to schools, roads, hospitals and the improvement of agriculture. Many thousands of Venezuelans began earning relatively high salaries. The middle class expanded, illiteracy decreased, ideas flowed in from the outer world. A climate was being created for freedom.

The process was slow and erratic. The last military leader able to keep a lid on this ferment was the brutal and predatory dictator, General Juan Vicente Gómez, who stayed in power for an incredible 27 years until he died peacefully in bed in 1935. By that time the forces demanding civil rights were strong enough to make another, equally authoritarian ruler impossible for any length of time.

The next two presidents were also generals—Eleázar López Contreras and Isaías Medina Angarita—but they were relatively democratic. During their regimes a powerful civilian movement known as Acción Democrática took form and, in alliance with a group of disgruntled young officers, seized power in 1945. One of those officers, ironically, was the then Major Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

### Rise of Opposition

The army permitted the civilians three turbulent years of power during which Acción Democrática resorted to a certain amount of the oppression it had condemned in previous regimes. But these were years in which there was a great deal of civic freedom and the Venezuelan people were once and for all injected with the germ of liberty.

When Pérez Jiménez and some fellow officers engineered the expected military coup in November 1948, the people were still not strong or determined enough to stop these typically predatory usurpers. But they had gone beyond the point where they would be resigned to endure a greedy, corrupt, brutal regime just for the sake of cemetery-like law and order and a few crumbs spent on spectacular public works and some schools, hospitals and roads.

The Venezuelans showed this mood when Pérez Jiménez, who had never been very bright, made the mistake of holding a presidential election in November 1952, which he thought had been safely prepared in his favor. His really colossal error was to permit a secret ballot. When the returns started coming in he found them running four to one against him, so he stopped counting and stayed in power.

Last year he determined to prolong his presidency for five years more. He thought he would be clever, and this time—on December 15, 1957—he held a so-called plebiscite in which the people could vote for him and for nobody else. This was his undoing.

The opposition began organizing underground in a "Junta Patriótica" as long ago as last August. Many young military officers, imbued for the first time in Venezuelan history with a desire for civil liberty, not spoils, and deeply ashamed at the figure Venezuela was cutting in the world, also plotted to overthrow the dictatorship. Someone betrayed them,

but a group of brave air force officers and one ground unit rose on New Year's morning.

### Broken Log Jam

The rebellion was premature, but it was like breaking a log jam. The university students, always in the vanguard of Latin American struggles for freedom, were already fighting, going to jail and suffering torture in the cause of liberty. Even the Roman Catholic Church had stepped in last May with a scathing denunciation of social injustices by the Archbishop of Caracas, Msgr. Rafael Arias. Then the intellectuals, the professional men, some businessmen and, finally, the "common man" rose and fought, and that was the end.

General Pérez Jiménez did not see the writing on the wall. He still thought that tanks and machine guns, sold to him by the United States, could keep him in power. After all, President Eisenhower himself had decorated Pérez Jiménez with the Legion of Merit. The last two American ambassadors, career officer Fletcher Warren and political appointee Dempster McIntosh, had been notably friendly to the dictator and his regime. The oil companies had been glad to see "law and order," although they kept out of politics and were most enlightened in their policies.

Nothing could save Pérez Jiménez, and no military dictator will take his place. A period of internal conflict and confusion is inevitable, but both the decent military elements and the

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## Should U.S. Trade with Red China?

There are more angles to the question, "Should U.S. trade with Red China?" than first meet the eye. For much more is involved here than trade. In fact, such trade as may be in mind, no matter how much, is by far the least important factor at stake.

For the United States this is a political question—and still a red-hot one, although now it is at least discussible, which was not the case some years ago. China trade is also a sore point with our allies—and for all kinds of reasons.

Until 1957 the United States had kept the lid on Red China trade, imposed at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. During the past year Washington reluctantly agreed to let our allies do a certain amount of trading in certain items with Peiping—but it wants to have no part of such trade itself. The fact that our allies were prepared to trade anyway, with or without Washington's permission, may somewhat spoil our posture of resignation; but it indicates that American officials could see the way the tide was running.

### How Much Trade Is There?

But if our allies would like to see the United States take an even more tolerant view toward Red China trade, they do not necessarily want us to go overboard. While they would like to have us make trade with Red China easier for them, they are not necessarily interested in seeing us start trading with Peiping. To put it crassly, they do not want to divide whatever small Red China trade pie there is with Uncle Sam.

One thing that both Washington and our allies have to realize about

trade with Red China is that the good old days are gone beyond recall. The Chinese Communists have re-oriented their trade so that now 75 percent of it is with the Soviet bloc. This is a relationship that is going to be hard to break—even though Peiping might like to break it—or even to bend westward a little.

It is reported that the West's embargo on oil shipments to Red China is having an impact on the country's economy; that Moscow is not able—or willing—to meet Peiping's demand for oil; and that Red China's industrialization and collectivization programs have been hampered as a result. But so far no one in the West has proposed that "strategic goods" be sold to Red China. So the sale of oil is in any case not in the picture. What is under discussion is the question of increasing a relatively little trade to a relatively little more.

### What Does Peiping Want?

There is much talk that Peiping is itself working to step up trade with capitalist countries—and for two very good reasons. It has learned that Moscow's economic barrel has a very definite bottom; and it is interested in developing a second string to its economic bow. It is nice to be embraced by the Soviet bear, but there are also dangers in this embrace.

In the United States, opposition to trade with Red China is possibly less violent but just as firm as when the trade embargo was imposed in 1950. There are, of course, a few businessmen who continue to press for trading rights with Peiping, but the trade involved is so small that their voice is little more than a whisper.

Meanwhile, trade with Red China continues to be tied up with recognition of Peiping and its admission to represent China in the United Nations. And while each issue has its own separate pros and cons, public opinion tends to throw them all together as if they represented a single problem. One reason why the Administration feels so strongly about trade—or more accurately no trade—with Red China is psychological rather than moral. It is that trading suggests respectability, and respectability suggests acceptance, and acceptance suggests recognition. In other words, if the United States were to break down this one barrier to its quarantine of Peiping, a chain reaction would be touched off. It would be harder to keep Peiping out of the UN, and if it enters the UN it would be harder to deny it recognition. And if we recognize Peiping, this, it is argued, would cause millions of overseas Chinese to shift their support to mainland China and encourage neutrals throughout Asia to be neutral "for" rather than "against" the Chinese Communists.

For the time being, to ask whether the United States should trade with Red China is a little like asking, Should I plan a trip to the moon? In spite of Sputnik and Explorer there is about as much chance of our trading with Red China now or in the near future as there is of getting to the moon. Both may be inevitable; but neither is imminent.

NEAL STANFORD

(This is the seventh of eight articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1958"—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?"—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)





## Middle East Again in Flux

The launching of the United States Explorer on January 31 relieved in some measure the mood of exaggerated pessimism and anxiety which had gripped the United States when Russia sent Sputnik I spinning around the earth. The balance of power—now admittedly a balance of terror—seemed at least temporarily righted.

This scientific-military success, however, coincided with fresh evidence that the most significant long-range challenge to the United States may be not the threat of war, but political and economic changes which could jeopardize the military alliances carefully constructed by the West and financed primarily by Washington.

No sooner had Secretary of State John Foster Dulles assured the five Baghdad pact countries at the Ankara conference, January 27-30, that American "mobile power of great force would, as needed, be brought to bear against any Communist aggressor" than the Middle East cold war battleground was transformed, without resort to aggression, by the union of Egypt and Syria on February 1.

### Ankara Results

Russia's four southern neighbors—Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan—which with Britain are members of the Baghdad alliance formed in 1955—had hoped that Mr. Dulles would give them a pledge of full United States participation and additional financial aid. Mr. Dulles, however, stopped short of making the United States a member of the Baghdad pact council. The United States, although eager for support in the Middle East, has been reluctant to consummate

the alliance for fear of antagonizing Egypt and other nonmember Arab countries on the one hand, and Israel, opposed by all the Arab governments, on the other.

While Turkey has staunchly backed the Baghdad pact, in spite of Moscow threats and blandishments, fissures in the alliance appeared before and during the Ankara conference. One of the strongest supporters of the West, former Iraqi Premier Nuri as-Said, denounced Israel at Ankara in terms that might have been applauded in Cairo. And Pakistan, seeming to confirm one of Moscow's accusations, asked the United States for missiles which, if given, would cause a furor in India. These jarring notes were excluded from the final communiqué. And the United States tried to soften disappointment over the modesty of its additional economic aid by politely urging its partners to complete development projects before asking funds for new ones.

### Toward Arab Unity?

Meanwhile, Egypt and Syria, which had refused to join the Baghdad pact at its inception, dramatically announced in Cairo their merger into a single new nation to be known as the United Arab Republic. This merger, completed with feverish speed while the Ankara conferees were in session, brings together two unequal partners which share the age-old dream of Arab unity.

Egypt, with its large, impoverished agrarian population of 24 million, could conceivably find relief by settling some of its farmers in Syria, which has a population of 4 million, room for more people, and a higher

standard of living. Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, military dictator of a one-party nation, is also to rule over Syria, which has disbanded its various political parties. The fact that as a result the Communist party, which has been gaining influence in Syria, has also been dissolved leads some observers to believe that the union came as an unpleasant surprise to Moscow as well as to Washington. For in Egypt Nasser has taken drastic action to suppress Communists.

The two states are separated by 150 miles of territory of Israel and Jordan, both hostile to the new union. This has aroused concern over the possibility that the United Arab Republic might try sooner or later to absorb both. The proclamation signed by President Nasser and Syrian President Shukri al-Kuwatly envisages a united Arab area from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. All Arab nations are invited to join the new republic "in union or federation."

So far only Yemen, a kingdom, has accepted the principle of "a broad union," with details to be worked out by a joint committee. Of the three other kingdoms, Iraq and Jordan promptly established a federation of their own on February 14. This federation is to be ruled by King Faisal of Iraq, with his cousin, King Hussein of Jordan, acting as his deputy. Unlike Egypt and Syria, the two monarchies have contiguous territories; and the oil wealth of Iraq, relatively underpopulated, could strengthen the economy of Jordan, burdened by the presence of Arab refugees from Palestine.

It is not yet clear whether Iraq will withdraw from the Baghdad pact.

*(Continued on page 96)*



## Deadlock in Algeria

by Benjamin Rivlin

Dr. Rivlin, associate professor of political science at Brooklyn College, spent last year in France and North Africa conducting research on North African affairs. This was his third trip to the area since 1951.

**T**HE Franco-Tunisian crisis has thrown harsh light on the war in Algeria, now in its fourth year. As this bitter struggle goes on and on, seemingly without end, concern is steadily growing over the serious effects it is having on the cause of the West throughout Africa and Asia. What are the prospects for a settlement of the war in 1958?

At one time or other during the bitter long-drawn out war, three approaches other than an outright military settlement have been suggested as a means of resolving the Algerian situation. These have been (1) mediation by a third party or parties; (2) direct negotiation between the French and the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN); and (3) a unilateral policy of French "reform" legislation for Algeria. So far attempts to implement any of these have all proved unsuccessful.

### New Developments

To evaluate the prospects for an Algerian settlement in 1958 one must examine the conflict in the light of the following significant recent developments relating to Algeria, which profoundly affect any steps toward a solution.

First, Tunisia and Morocco, Algeria's neighbors and the two countries besides France most directly affected by the war, once again have offered to mediate the Algerian-French dispute. Second, the UN General Assembly debated the Algerian question in the autumn of 1957 and unanimously adopted a

resolution taking note of the good offices proffered by Morocco and Tunisia and expressing the wish that talks aimed at a solution of the Algerian problem be undertaken. Third, the war in Algeria once again spilled over into Tunisia and brought on a serious crisis in the already strained Franco-Tunisian relations. Fourth, France, with a fanfare of publicity, heralded the arrival of the first shipment of oil from the Sahara after a trip across strife-torn Algeria. Fifth, a long-suppressed report of a French commission of inquiry confirming the use of torture and other extreme measures by French military authorities against Muslim civilians in Algeria was made public in Paris. Sixth, the French National Assembly passed a *loi-cadre* (framework law), introducing administrative and political "reforms" designed eventually to give the Algerian Muslims a greater share in the political life of Algeria. And, seventh, the French economy, hard hit by the drain on its resources due in large part to the Algerian war, was bolstered in January by \$655.25 million of economic aid from the United States, the International Monetary Fund and the European Payments Union. Taken together, all of these developments will vitally affect the course of events in and about Algeria during the coming months.

### Is Arms Victory Possible?

The first question that comes to mind as fighting continues is whether a military settlement is possible in Algeria. New financial aid to France rules out any possibility that the

French military operations in Algeria will grind to a halt as a result of a breakdown of the French economy. Yet this does not guarantee that French military forces will now go on to achieve a military victory. The French have committed upward of 500,000 men and the most modern military equipment to the war in Algeria. Moreover, in combating the rebellion they have used extreme measures against the Muslim civilian population. In their attempt to stem the flow of arms to the rebels, they have tightened security measures on Algeria's frontiers, including the erection of an electrified fence and of mine fields along the Algerian-Tunisian border.

Despite all these precautions the Algerian rebels have continued to obtain arms and to wage war. All that the French have been able to achieve is to cut down on the acts of terror in the large cities and along the major routes of communication. The arrival of the Saharan oil at the Mediterranean early in January was publicized partly to demonstrate that the security problem was under control. However, despite extraordinary security measures the rebels succeeded in sabotaging the oil train three times within one month. The blunt fact is that the French have been unable to check the rebel forces who wage a guerrilla war from the cover of mountains. All reports from the interior of Algeria indicate that the prospects of a French military victory in 1958 have not improved.

As for the rebels, their forces are too small and too ill-equipped to

undertake the full-scale war necessary to achieve a total victory over the French. The most they are capable of doing is to continue their guerrilla tactics, intensifying their efforts to the best of their ability, with the hope of convincing the French people that a military victory is impossible and that negotiations are the only way out of the Algerian dilemma. At this time neither side seems capable of winning a total victory.

### How About Negotiations?

Prospects for a settlement of the Algerian war through direct negotiation seem to be equally remote. One of the cardinal principles in the French position has been unwillingness to recognize the FLN as a spokesman for the Algerian people. The war in Algeria, from the French point of view, is a rebellion. The moment negotiations are entered into with the FLN, this rebellion would acquire an aura of legitimacy. In fact, direct negotiations are what the rebels have been aiming for almost since the outset.

One of the principal stumbling blocks to direct negotiations has been the absence of a common understanding of what is to be negotiated. At times the French have been prepared to talk with FLN people concerning a ~~cease-fire~~, but the FLN has always insisted that the discussions be concerned with independence. During the early months of the premiership of Guy Mollet, a series of unofficial meetings took place between a spokesman for Mollet and a representative of the FLN. However, no progress was made at these meetings in bringing the two sides any closer to an understanding of what could be negotiated.

For the past year and a half the political atmosphere in France has become so charged with emotion that any government contact with the

FLN is unthinkable. Only a major shift in French public opinion would enable the government to undertake negotiations with the Algerian rebels. Negotiations imply compromises. Since the capture of the five FLN leaders in October 1956 and the Suez crisis, the French have become more uncompromising than ever on the Algerian question. Under these circumstances it hardly seems likely that 1958 will bring a settlement in Algeria through direct negotiations.

Equally bleak are the prospects for third-party mediation of the Algerian problem. Again the main difficulty here is that mediation involves compromise, which France is unable to make. Mediation implies that the Algerian situation is an "international dispute," a point which the French government is adamant in rejecting. According to the French, the rebellion is solely a matter of French domestic jurisdiction and of no concern to the UN or to any other possible mediator, be it Tunisia or Morocco. Acceptance by the French of outside mediation would mean an admission that the Algerian war is not a matter solely within French domestic jurisdiction.

The recent offer of good offices by the king of Morocco and the president of Tunisia merely represents another attempt on their part to help speed an Algerian solution. The Algerian war has directly affected the well-being and security of these two states. Both countries, so dependent on friendly relations with France in their crucial period of transition from colonial status to independence, have been unable to regularize their relations with France because of the repercussions of the Algerian war. Sympathizing with the cause of the Algerian nationalists and believing that independence for Algeria is inevitable, as it was in their own cases, they have at various times in the past made attempts to convince France of

the necessity of reaching an understanding with the FLN.

These previous efforts have been to no avail, for the French have been wary of Moroccan and Tunisian intervention. To many Frenchmen, Morocco and Tunisia, because of the extensive aid accorded by them to the Algerian rebels, are as much part of the Algerian rebellion as is the FLN itself. In view of these considerations, it seems unlikely that France would be prepared to agree to mediation in 1958, least of all by Tunisia and Morocco. One can anticipate that the two countries will increase the pressure on France to sit down with the Algerian rebels. They have indicated that in the interests of hastening a settlement and of helping France save face, they would urge the Algerian rebels to accept a solution short of independence. Morocco and Tunisia are undoubtedly willing to act as intermediaries between France and the rebels, but any such role depends on France's readiness to alter its present stand. Although at the moment there are no signs that France is prepared to make any such concessions, one must not rule out this possibility completely, for in politics—particularly French politics—the unexpected may well happen.

### How New is New Law?

At the moment France thinks in terms of a settlement exclusively of its own making and on its own terms. By extending a measure of political autonomy to the Muslim population and by pursuing a program of land reform, France hopes to alienate the masses from the rebel demand for independence. In this way the French hope that the rebel position will be undercut and that peace will eventually return to an Algeria which remains under French sovereignty.

New legislation for Algeria has recently been adopted by the French

government, following months of wrangling in both houses of the French parliament. Since the new legislation is in the form of a *loi-cadre*—a “framework law” which is a statement of principles that requires subsequent governmental decrees—it is difficult at this time to see clearly just how the new system would work. What it purports to do is to create five territories or regions in Algeria, which are to enjoy local autonomy. Actually, however, the powers of the autonomous regions are so sharply circumscribed by powers reserved to the central government in Paris or to local municipalities that it is difficult to imagine what is meant when the *loi-cadre* says that each region is to conduct “its own affairs freely and democratically.”

One of the political questions at the root of the Algerian rebellion is the division of the electorate in Algeria into two colleges—one French and the other Muslim—with each college carrying equal weight at the polls although the Muslims outnumber the French nine to one. The new law calls for a single college in elections to the regional assemblies. At the same time it provides for a council of communities in each region for which the election would not be in a single college, but on a community basis rather than on an individual basis. Thus, the law, on the one hand, abolishes the two-college system and then, on the other hand, immediately re-establishes it. All the electoral provisions of the law, as well as the provisions for the possible creation of an Algerian federation of all the regions, are highly theoretical, for Paris does not plan to hold elections until peace is restored to each region. At the outset members of the various regional bodies are going to be appointed by the French.

Reduced to its essentials, the new law is a design for (1) maintaining

absolute French control over Algeria; (2) preserving nearly all of the rights and privileges of the European minority; and (3) presenting the very few and limited concessions made to the Muslim population as “reforms” to the world at large. It is unlikely that the Muslim population will be convinced by this. When one considers the difficulties which this legislation encountered in the French parliament; the watering down of any genuine reforms that were originally discussed; the vagueness of many of its provisions; the acknowledgment by most informed persons in Paris and in Algeria that chances for its implementation are very slight; and the very hostile reception it was accorded by Algerian nationalists of all shades of opinion, one can not take this legislation seriously as a step toward a solution of the Algerian situation. From the Algerian point of view the reform legislation contains much too little and has come much too late.

### Deadlock Now More Serious

Given this situation one must conclude that the new law offers as little prospect for an Algerian settlement in 1958 as do third-party mediation, direct negotiations or an outright military victory for either side. Thus the deadlock is more serious than ever. Instead of bringing the opposing sides closer together time has pushed them further and further apart. It has become apparent that the French government, given the political make-up of the French National Assembly, is unable to undertake a serious reform program in Algeria. Whereas France yielded to the inevitable in granting independence to Morocco and Tunisia, it is unwilling to do so in Algeria. In fact it seems bent on proving that the nationalist drive toward independence in colonial territories is not inevitable at all, but can be readily stopped.

France's resistance has been sharpened by the discovery of oil in the Sahara, which has brought dreams of economic resurgence and an end to French dependence on foreign sources of oil. The importance of Saharan oil for the Algerian situation can not be exaggerated. The hardening of France's attitude, its determination to ignore nationalist demands, can only be explained in terms of Saharan oil. Without this France would be more apt to compromise than it is now.

Although the French realize that at the moment they are not in a position to win a military victory, they know that the other side is in no position to do so either. They are therefore determined to hold on, hoping that time will work for them and that under more favorable circumstances they will be able to re-establish complete control over Algeria.

Meanwhile, the French attitude hardens the position of the Algerian rebels. They can be expected to intensify military operations and to stir up the Muslim population to resist all French efforts at reforms. Recent reports indicate that the rebels have no real shortage of arms, that their morale is high and that they are getting increasing support from the outside. Thus, short of a sharp reversal of the French government's present attitude, which does not seem likely, the deadlock in Algeria can be expected to continue. However, the Sakiët-Sidi-Youssef incident has had the result of internationalizing the Algerian issue.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Karl Brandt, “Solution for Algeria,” *Fortune*, February 1958; Lorna Hahn, “Last Chance in North Africa,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 1958; M. M. Knight, “The Algerian Revolt: Some Underlying Factors,” *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1956; Joseph Kraft, “I Saw the Algerian Rebels in Action,” *The Saturday Evening Post*, January 11 and 18, 1958; Benjamin Rivlin, “France's Algerian Dilemma,” *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*, December 1, 1956.



## Spotlight

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And Saudi Arabia so far remains aloof from both the new Arab units. The big question is whether the Middle East as a whole, and the Arab countries of North Africa, will over the long run be more powerfully attracted to the United Arab Republic or to the Iraq-Jordan federation.

Hitherto, the West has viewed Nasser with apprehension, regarding him as an "imperialist" and a stooge of Moscow. This estimate, considered as not sound by those who know the Egyptian president, may have to be revised. Time may show that Nasser, far from being a tool of Moscow any more than of London or Washington, will appear to Arabs as a symbol of the independence for which they have long striven—first against the Ottoman Empire and then, after Turkey had been defeated in World War I, against Britain and France. Instead of undermining the West, an independent, united Arab area might safeguard the Middle East from Russian intervention and even have sufficient confidence in its own future to open negotiations with Israel.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## Matthews

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civilian politicians are showing restraint and patriotism. There are now two major political parties in

addition to Acción Democrática—the Democratic Republican Union (URD) and the Christian democratic party (COPEI)—and there is a small Communist party.

Vengeance was natural and overdue, especially in the case of the brutal security police, but their chief, one of the most sadistic figures in contemporary Latin America, Pedro Estrada, got out of the country in good time.

The United States will not suffer in the long run. The great American investments are safe, but it will obviously not be as easy to deal with free, nationalistic and perhaps somewhat radical governments as it was with accommodating dictators who pocketed a part of the income from foreign investments.

Mr. Matthews has been with *The New York Times* since 1922, and since 1949 has served as a member of its editorial staff, covering Latin American and Spanish affairs. He is the author of *The Yoke and the Arrows: A Report on Spain* (New York, Braziller, 1957) and "The U.S. and Latin America," *Headline Series* No. 100 (New York, Foreign Policy Association, July 1953).

## FPA Bookshelf

### NORTH AFRICA

France's tragic dilemma in North Africa is eloquently and frankly dissected in *Lieutenant in Algeria*, by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, distinguished French journalist and editor of *L'Express*, which has supported Mendès-France (New York, Knopf, 1957, \$3.50). The author, who saw military service in Algeria, spares no words in

denouncing ruthless French measures to suppress the Algerian rebellion, but retains faith in his country's capacity to find a democratic solution for the dilemma of a nation which believes in liberty and equality, yet has found it difficult to apply these beliefs to a Muslim territory with a powerful minority of French settlers.

Readers whose interest in Morocco may have been whetted by the visit of King Mohammed V may want to look at Rom Landau's *Moroccan Drama, 1900-1955*, published in 1956 by the American Academy of Asian Studies in San Francisco, in which the author, well acquainted with that country, gives the story of events which preceded its achievement of independence.

### RUSSIA

Two experts on Russian affairs reassess the U.S.S.R. in the light of events since Stalin's death. Louis Fischer, distinguished American journalist, takes a new look at Russia and its satellites in *Russia Revisited* (New York, Doubleday, 1957, \$4.00) with his usual verve. He reaches the conclusion that Russia, beset with internal contradictions, cannot win, and that "retreat from empire" would ease its economic strains. Isaac Deutscher, Polish-born writer now living in Britain, takes a different view, and asserts in *Russia in Transition* (New York, Coward-McCann, 1957, \$4.50), a collection of essays, that, like the French after the travail of the Revolution, the Russians are "at last relearning freedom."

Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, who parachuted into Yugoslavia during World War II and became intimately acquainted with Marshal Tito, paints a remarkably interesting portrait of the marshal in *The Heretic: the Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito* (New York, Harper, 1957, \$5.95).

### MIDDLE EAST

*The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers*, by Benjamin Shwadran. New York, Praeger, 1955. \$7.00.

The editor of *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Mr. Shwadran here deals with one of the major problems and assets of the Middle East. Sketching the history of oil in the area over the last 50 years, the author describes the impact of the exploitation of petroleum and rivalries over oil rights and gives an account, too, of the part American oil companies have played in the Middle East.

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